Irene Khan, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, warned that "the weaponisation of public anger against journalists and artists is dangerous at any time, and especially now as the country prepares for elections. It could have a chilling effect on media freedom, minority voices and dissenting views with serious consequences for democracy."
Late in the evening on December 18, 2024, a seven-word post on the verified Facebook page of Elias Hossain, a Bangladeshi online activist based in the United States of America, read: “Prothom Alo-r ekta iint o jyano na thake” (Let not a single brick of Prothom Alo remain).
The post was broadcast to more than 2.2 million followers of Hossain, amplified by Facebook’s verification badge and shared rapidly across WhatsApp, Instagram, and other Facebook pages. Within hours, a crowd gathered outside the Dhaka office of Prothom Alo, one of Bangladesh’s largest media houses. By late night, the building was being vandalised.
The man who issued the command was 7,800 miles away in Jackson Heights, New York, likely between Uber rides.
This was not a spontaneous eruption of mob violence. Hossain wasn't acting alone either. Four thousand miles away in Paris, his close collaborator Pinaki Bhattacharya had spent over a year building the groundwork for exactly this moment. Together, the two expatriate influencers had waged a relentless online campaign against Bangladesh's most prominent media houses, systematically targetting their credibility and painting them as enemies of the people.
It was a carefully orchestrated campaign of digital incitement, revealing a dangerous gap in how social media platforms govern transnational violence: individuals operating from Western democracies can organise mob attacks in fragile states with near-total impunity, while the governments hosting them and the companies enabling them take no responsibility.
Within hours of the Prothom Alo attack, Hossain directed the mob towards The Daily Star, another major publication in Bangladesh.
Journalists trapped inside posted desperate pleas on Facebook as smoke filled the building. "I can't breathe anymore. There's too much smoke. I'm inside. You are killing me," wrote journalist Zyma Islam.
Hours later, after journalists were rescued by the army well past midnight, Hossain posted: "Daily Star done, well done boys!" It drew over 84,000 reactions.
The Architecture Of Algorithmic Violence
Elias Hossain and Pinaki Bhattacharya have built what amounts to a remote-controlled mob apparatus, powered almost entirely by Meta's platforms and YouTube's recommendation algorithms. Together, they command nearly 15 million followers across Facebook and YouTube—a digital army larger than the population of several Bangladeshi cities.
Hossain operates four Facebook pages with a cumulative reach of over 3.5 million followers, alongside a YouTube channel boasting 4.78 million subscribers. Bhattacharya's verified Facebook page has 2.9 million followers; his YouTube channel draws 4.1 million more.
Using Google's Transparency Tool, Decode discovered a monetised YouTube channel called Shimana TV 24 with over 176,000 subscribers, created in August 2022, featuring almost exclusively Bhattacharya's content. The channel generates revenue through advertisements displayed on videos. Meanwhile, Bhattacharya has repeatedly claimed he does not need money from YouTube and claims that he uses his follower base as a “power of the powerless.”
For more than a year, Bhattacharya and Hossain have run parallel and often overlapping campaigns against Prothom Alo and The Daily Star. Through Facebook posts, livestreams and YouTube videos, they have accused the newspapers of being pro-India, hostile to Islam, and complicit in violence against religious scholars. Both have repeatedly alleged, without evidence, that the publications act on behalf of India’s foreign intelligence agency.
The claims travelled far, creating an ecosystem of distrust and rage.
From Posts To Streets
Dhaka had been tense since December 12, when youth political activist Sharif Osman Hadi was shot in the head in broad daylight. Hadi, who later died from his injuries in Singapore, was allegedly attacked by men linked to the Awami League, the party of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who had fled Bangladesh in August 2024 amid mass protests.
When news of Hadi's death broke on the evening of December 18, outrage surged across social media. Thousands gathered at Shahbag square, demanding action.
And then the collective grief was weaponised. Minutes after the news of the death spread, Hossain posted his ‘not a single brick’ call. Similar calls were issued by leaders of Islamic Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and other Islamist activists. But Hossain's reach dwarfed them all.
By 10:30 PM, large crowds had gathered outside Prothom Alo's office. By 11 PM, vandalism had begun.
Hossain continued posting in real-time, directing the violence like a conductor.
"Come to Prothom Alo, everyone. Half the work's done, you people do the rest," read one update that drew tens of thousands of reactions. In another, he warned protesters to confront the army if it intervened.
After Prothom Alo, he redirected the mob. "India's den won't be allowed to exist in this country," he declared, urging those at Shahbag to march on The Daily Star's office. That post was shared over 1,500 times.
The vandalism spread beyond the newsrooms to the premises of prominent cultural institutions Chhayanaut and Udichi, and several Indian establishments.
The day after, press secretary Shafiqul Alam wrote in a Facebook post that despite receiving "frantic, tear-choked calls for help" from The Daily Star and Prothom Alo journalists and making "scores of calls to the right people, trying to mobilise help," it did not arrive in time. He called it "one of the country's worst mob attacks and arsons on media outlets."
"To all my friends, I am deeply sorry that I failed you. I wish I could dig up a great piece of earth and bury myself in shame," Alam wrote. He did not respond to messages sent by Decode asking how these content creators were allowed to mobilise mob violence in Bangladesh for over a year with almost a free run.
On January 27, Dhaka-based English daily New Age editor Nurul Kabir said, "If the chief adviser's press secretary cannot get help when major media houses are under attack, it means the government allowed this to happen."
Kamal Ahmed, Consulting editor at The Daily Star described the attacks as likely among the first instances anywhere in the world where mobs were organised and directed in real time through live social media broadcasts to carry out serious violence.
"These incidents raise profound concerns about the future of independent media and press freedom, as well as the growing threat posed by social media influencers operating from abroad, often from safe havens, driven by far-right extremist ideologies or representing shadowy interest groups," he told Decode.
Ahmed, who also headed the Media Reform Commission in Bangladesh last year, said governments in countries like Bangladesh must strengthen their capacity to counter these hate preachers, while the international community should urgently develop mechanisms to hold major technology companies accountable.
The Demagogue Duo
Hossain calls himself an investigative journalist. He started as a crime reporter and host at Dhaka-based Ekushey Television before fleeing Bangladesh in 2015, citing threats of arrest or harassment. He now lives in Jackson Heights, New York, and works part-time as an Uber driver, according to his social media posts.
Bhattacharya, a physician by training, says he works at L'Oréal, the French multinational corporation. A political activist, he left Bangladesh secretly in 2018, fearing arrest or forced disappearance.
Bhattacharya's trajectory is particularly striking. A Hindu by birth and former member of the Communist Party of Bangladesh—the party expelled him in 2014—he has reinvented himself as a defender of Islamist positions. He has publicly objected to the teaching of evolution in schools, arguing it demeans Islam.
This ideological transformation has coincided with explosive growth in his online following and influence among Bangladesh's religious conservative base.
From abroad, Hossain and Bhattacharya have carried out relentless campaigns against Sheikh Hasina's rule, earning massive popularity among anti-Hasina activists, particularly Islamists. Their content has frequently been accused of spreading misinformation and unverified claims. After the mass uprising toppled Hasina's government on August 5, 2024, Hossain and Bhattacharya gained unprecedented influence despite remaining thousands of miles away.
Prothom Alo's executive editor Sajjad Sharif told Decode that the expatriate YouTubers have an extensive ideological network in Bangladesh, mostly affiliated with different right-wing groups and parties, including extremist and radical individuals.
These groups target Prothom Alo from three perspectives, Sharif explained. The first is physical—causing damage to an institution that stands for a democratic, secular, non-discriminatory society, an ideology they oppose. The second is strategic—there are reasons to suspect the attacks were designed to derail the election process and paralyse the administration. The third is symbolic—sending a warning to all who share Prothom Alo's ideals.
"While we had to bear physical damage, the good thing is that the December 18 incident shook up many in the silent majority, who came forward in our support," Sharif said. "The government also became a little stricter in dealing with such issues than before."
Sharif acknowledged that ultra-rightwing activists and radical elements continue an intense vilification and disinformation campaign against them. However, Prothom Alo has not directly contacted social media platforms to report threats or disinformation. "We leave it to the government. We are trusting them with doing their job."
A Targetted Campaign For A Year
The assault on December 18 wasn't the duo’s first attempt. The pattern reveals calculated escalation, with each incident testing the boundaries of what they could orchestrate remotely.
October 2024: The newsrooms were gheraoed (surrounded) but heavy security prevented major damage. Hossain and Bhattacharya learned from this failure.
November 1, 2024: Hossain escalated the rhetoric. "If you want to exist, Prothom Alo and The Daily Star cannot be allowed to exist," he wrote on Facebook. It drew nearly 35,000 reactions, over 2,500 comments and was shared over 1,700 times. Most of the comments were in agreement with the call.
November 5: He threatened to expose Law Advisor Asif Nazrul's alleged "extramarital affair" for the crime of sharing a Prothom Alo article. He did not follow through.
November 13: Bhattacharya openly boasted about the psychological impact of their campaign. "Our relentless attacks on Prothom Alo and The Daily Star have managed to destroy the morale of their staff. They fear to report, they are not sure which photograph to carry," he wrote. The post drew over 32,000 reactions, 3,300 comments and was shared over 1,100 times.
He was explicit about the strategy: "Incessantly producing hatred against them is the only way to stop people from attending Prothom Alo events, writing columns for them, dancing at their Meril-Prothom Alo Awards and giving them advertisements."
November 26: Another gherao, another vandalisation of signboards. Hossain accused the media houses of being RAW (India's intelligence agency) offices and called them extremist-labelers of madrasa students.
Following trouble outside Prothom Alo's Dhaka office on six consecutive days from November 21, offices of both media houses came under attack in the cities of Rajshahi, Bogura and Chattogram.
The US-based Committee to Protect Journalists called for a swift investigation into the threats of violence against staff at both newspapers. The platform Bangladeshi Journalists in International Media expressed concern about the safety and security of journalists working there.
While Nahid Islam, the information advisor (minister) in the Bangladesh interim government, called upon the people not to take part in “any anarchic activity,” saying that they will not be tolerated in the future, these appeared to be empty words.
Finally, December 18, 2025: That day, Hossain wrote on Facebook: "Prothom Alo and The Daily Star are at the root of every problem Bangladesh faces." More than 37,000 reacted to the post, and over 1,000 shared it. Of the hundreds of comments, the majority called for a boycott, a ban, and the obliteration of the two media houses and the politicians backing them.
The Bulldozer Rally
The duo’s most dramatic show of influence came on February 5, 2025, with the demolition of 32 Dhanmondi — the ancestral home of Sheikh Hasina and the house where Bangladesh's founding president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his family were assassinated in 1975.
The structure had been vandalised and looted on August 5, 2024, when Hasina fled the country, but remained standing. For months afterwards, Bhattacharya and Hossain built momentum for its complete destruction.
The trigger came when Hasina decided to address her party's student wing via Facebook from exile in India. Earlier that afternoon, on a Facebook post, Bhattacharya asked people to gather “in millions” and finish the “unfinished task.”
The demolition was timed precisely to coincide with Hasina's 9 PM online speech. Both Bhattacharya and Hossain live-coordinated the gathering through continuous posts and video messages, instructing followers to begin demolition exactly when she started speaking.
The demolition of the house was timed to match Sheikh Hasina's speech. FahimHP/Wikimedia Commons
According to The Daily Star, thousands gathered at the site. Army personnel arrived around 9:30 PM, took positions on the main street, but then withdrew. Two bulldozers, one crane and dozens of hammers had been deployed.
As security forces arrived, Bhattacharya issued a direct warning to Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman in a video post: "Remove your army from 32, Waker miyan. You won't be able to handle it."
The army stood down. Local media reported that the growing crowd made the police hesitant, and they did not advance further in fear of attack. The army retreated similarly.
Over twelve hours, the three-story structure was reduced to rubble, broadcast live across multiple platforms and watched by millions.
The episode emboldened Bhattacharya. Weeks later, he warned against forgiving Hasina's party: "Can't you see what two-penny YouTubers can do?"
In a purportedly leaked audio clip, a voice resembling Hasina’s blamed Bhattacharya for the demolition. “It was after his threats that the army retreated,” says the voice. Bhattacharya shared the audio clip and wore it as a badge of honour.
The Power Nexus
Perhaps the most disturbing element of this story isn't the violence itself—it's the complicity and engagement of the interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.
On the night of December 18, as newsrooms burned, some protestors demanded the formation of a new government under Hossain and Bhattacharya. This wasn't just an online fantasy. These men had cultivated direct relationships with government officials, and they advertised these connections openly.
On October 6, 2024, Bhattacharya wrote a Facebook post outlining what he would do as health advisor (minister). Hours later, he posted that the actual health advisor had read it and asked staff to discuss his proposals. "I had a discussion with them. They have accepted the plan on principle. I will support the government in every possible way in executing it," he wrote.
Hossain has claimed that Law Advisor Asif Nazrul personally called him, requesting his return to Bangladesh and offering to "help with whatever he needed." Hossain says he declined.
The relationship with Faiz Ahmad Taiyeb, Special Assistant to Chief Adviser Yunus, appears particularly close. When one of Bhattacharya's videos was briefly blocked in Bangladesh on September 17, 2025, it was quickly unblocked. Bhattacharya announced proudly: "The video is accessible again, the government has informed me. Faiz Taiyeb has personally informed me that there was no instruction for blocking the video from the top level of the government."
However, when Meta finally removed Hossain's verified page after the December 18 violence, he threatened Taiyeb directly: "Faiz Ahmad Taiyeb, the assistant press secretary of the Chief Advisor, is the man behind blocking my Facebook page. A 15-minute episode on him is coming soon."
The Expanding Target List
Their ambitions grew with each successful operation. The pattern remained consistent: identify a target, build a narrative over weeks or months, then issue a call for mob action.
On February 23, 2025, Bhattacharya threatened cultural institution Udichi, demanding they abandon what he called the Awami League's "cultural narrative." "Hasina has fled, can she protect you from public anger?" he asked. Udichi came under attack on December 19—hours after the twin attack on media houses.
On March 14, he called for the takeover of the Communist Party of Bangladesh office in Dhaka. "I am saying I'll occupy their offices across the country. When I've said it, I'll do it, today or tomorrow, I'll capture all of CPB's offices," he declared in a video.
The party had expelled him in 2014, and he called them "Islamophobic" and "India's agent." The attempt failed, as building protectors outnumbered prospective vandals, but Bhattacharya vowed to try again.
On August 19, 2025, he threatened to mobilise mobs against economist Ashikur Rahman Shanto, who has past Awami League links, if he attended any government event: “You guys keep a watch—when, where, which government event Shanto is scheduled to attend. If he is visiting abroad on any government delegation. Inform me. A short notice is enough for me to gather 100 people."
After international condemnation of the December 18 attacks, Meta removed Hossain's verified page and restricted his YouTube channel. The Bangladeshi police arrested about 30 locals who participated in the violence. The government revoked the registration of Hossain's Dhaka-based media house, Bangla Edition.
But Hossain remained beyond reach in New York, defiant. "How many pages will you block, Dr. Yunus?" he taunted from another account. By January 25, 2026, he opened a new Facebook account, and it gained over 72,000 followers in less than 36 hours. He also revived a dormant profile and got it verified.
According to human rights activist and independent researcher Rezaur Rahman Lenin, incitement does not always create direct harm. Someone making statements like why one country should bomb another are just wishful incitement, he explained. This category need not necessarily come under legal purview unless it becomes an imminent threat.
"When the incitement is causing mobs to gather and violence to take place or be in preparation, the government or administration needs to step in," Lenin told Decode.
While people behind such actions can be booked using provisions of the Bangladesh Penal Code and the Cyber Surokkha Adhyadesh of 2025, the government faces two limitations with expatriates. First, it depends on the response of the country where the expatriate is based, if the government chooses to communicate. Second, social media platforms do not always abide by government take-down requests.
Lenin stressed that caution needs to be exercised while dealing with cases of hate speech or misinformation incitement on digital platforms. "Looking at such incitements from a security perspective has some inherent threats to free speech. The security-oriented perspective has led to militarisation and politicisation of the social media space and the State tends to use it to deny transparency and freedom of expression to the people," he said.
Bangladesh has a history of extensive use of digital platforms for spreading hatred and misinformation that often brings tragic consequences. At the same time, the country also has a history of using laws concerning digital security to stifle dissent and criticism.
Nazmul Ahasan, executive editor at Netra News, expressed frustration that the US and France "continue to host, with impunity, two of the major drivers of instability in Bangladesh." He called for terrorism and attempted murder charges against them.
Meta and YouTube did not respond to Decode's repeated requests for comment on why verified accounts were allowed to incite violence for over a year.
There has been growing evidence of Meta's failures in Bengali-language content moderation. In December 2025, Bangladesh's Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and the National Cyber Security Agency sent urgent letters to Meta requesting immediate action against violence-inciting content. The government urged Meta to strengthen Bengali-language moderation and contextual review, take immediate action against content inciting violence, and maintain special monitoring of Bangladesh-related content at least until the election concludes
Research has documented systemic problems with Meta's Bengali content moderation. Studies have found that Meta's content moderation policies use language that is dialectically specific to Indian Central Standard Bengali rather than the dialect used by most Bengali speakers in Bangladesh.
Dhaka-based fact-checker Qadaruddin Shishir explained that multiple factors enabled mob incidents after August 5, 2024. "After Hasina's escape, many took the law into their own hands due to mistrust of institutions, especially the police," he told Decode. The Yunus government couldn't restore trust in institutions, while those who led the uprising failed to fulfill popular aspirations.
"Some bloggers, some in the name of journalism, are provoking people with half-truths or false information. They are not only inciting but also giving instructions to attack places," Shishir said. He noted that extremists became a significant part of incited mobs.
Sumon Rahman, Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh and founder of FactWatch, a prominent fact-checking newsroom in the country, told Decode that Bhattacharya and Hossain played a crucial role in mobilising people during the anti-Hasina uprising. However, after realising their immense capacity to mobilise with few to resist them, they seemed to b enjoying their own power.
"Since incidents of mob violence received apparent moral legitimacy as response to genuine grievances and the government kept pleading helplessness, taking law into one's own hands became easy. Social media influencers literally enjoyed a free run," Rahman said.
He believes social media algorithms also encourage instigators to continue. "The virality of content is the ultimate goal of the social media algorithm. Extreme content and polarised opinions work better. Therefore, social media provokes its users to produce something spectacular."
As Bangladesh prepares for national elections scheduled for February 12, 2026, the question isn't whether Hossain and Bhattacharya will continue their campaigns;they've already promised they will. The question is whether the platforms hosting them, the governments sheltering them, and the Bangladeshi authorities who quietly empower them will finally be held accountable.
What happened in Bangladesh is not unique. Similar patterns of platform-enabled violence have emerged in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and India. But the Hossain-Bhattacharya case stands out for its brazenness, its live-streamed coordination, and its extensive digital footprint that makes accountability theoretically possible, if anyone had the will to pursue it.
Decode has emailed Elias Hossain and Pinaki Bhattacharya for their response. The story will be updated if and when they respond.
This story has been edited by Adrija Bose
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